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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Was the court below correct in holding that FOL's action is
subject to the "diligent prosecution" bars of 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319(g)(6)(A) & 1365(b)(1)(B) because the Rocky Mountain De-
partment of Environment and Natural Resources (RMDENR) is-
sued an administrative order directing MMC to cease activity,
even though the statutory provision under which the RMDENR
acted did not address water pollution, provide for citizen partici-
pation, or authorize RMDENR to assess penalties? If not, was the
court correct in holding that the order barred both injunctive relief
and monetary civil penalties?
2. Was the court below correct in holding that it had no jurisdic-
tion under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) because the non-permitted over-
burden remaining in Lustra Creek does not constitute a
continuing violation under 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)?
3. Was the court below correct in holding that the case is moot
because MMC ceased violating the Clean Water Act more than
three years ago, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and MMC
does not threaten to do so again in the indefinite future?
4. Was the court below correct in holding that the State's version
of res judicata barred FOL's suit because FOL was in privity with
the State, even though the two have different enforcement objec-
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TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellee Magma Mining Co. (MMC) respectfully files this
Brief of Appellee.
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States . . . to Controversies . .. between a State, or the
Citizens thereof."
Relevant statutory provisions of the Clean Water Act (the
"Act") are addressed in the text. Other statutes include the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901, 6972
(1994). The full text of all relevant statutory provisions are laid
out in the attached Appendix.
Relevant regulatory provisions are laid out in the attached
Appendix and include: 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1999), 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(e) (1999), and 43 C.F.R. § 23.3(d) (1983).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE***
Facts
The following facts are uncontested. Magma Mining Co.
(MMC) operates an open pit opal mine on the side of Magic Moun-
tain. (R. 4). During mining operations, MMC must remove over-
burden rock lying above the opal deposit. Id. As it developed the
mine in three separate phases, MMC intermittently removed this
overburden from January 1980 through January 1998 and placed
the overburden at the base of the mountain, covering the Lustra
Creek for about half a mile. Id. Since January 1998, MMC has
not placed any additional overburden on top of the creek bed. Id.
While MMC has planned a phase four to the mine, MMC has not
decided to place the overburden in the creek, even though it is the
easiest and cheapest method of disposal. Id. Nor has MMC de-
cided when the planned phase will begin; however, it will be at
least over one year from now before the new phase begins. Id.
*** Editors Note: References to the Record may be found reprinted in Appendix A
of the Yale Law School Brief. The original page number of the Record has been
indicated within Appendix A of the Yale Brief by bracketed page numbers, e.g. [M n].
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In 1993, the State of Rocky Mountain Department of Environ-
mental and Natural Resources (RMDENR) determined that the
overburden on top of Lustra Creek constituted an unpermitted
landfill. Id. The RMDENR issued a notice of violation (NOV)
against MMC for disposing of the overburden rock in a landfill
without the permit required by the Rocky Mountain Solid Waste
Act (RMSWA). (R. 4). In August 1994, MMC and the RMDENR
agreed upon the issuance of an administrative consent order
under RMSWA which required MMC to immediately cease placing
additional overburden on top of the creek without a permit, imme-
diately plant with native vegetation, and nurture the vegetation
so that it would become indistinguishable from the adjacent vege-
tated areas within three years. Id. In 1998, MMC graded and
planted the overburden with native vegetation. Id. Since 1998,
little rain has fallen in the area, stunting the growth of the plant-
ings and preventing them from resembling the vegetation in adja-
cent areas as required by the order. Id. The RMDENR did not
give public notice of the issuance of the administrative order, of its
intention to issue the consent order, or of the NOV. Id.
The RMDENR stated in the preamble of the order that "[tihe
RMDENR finds that removal of the landfill from the Creek would
result in massive disruption of water quality by mud and silt ero-
sion during the removal process." Id. Currently, the concentra-
tion of suspended solids in the Lustra Creek is greater below the
landfill than above it; however, the concentration of suspended
solids below the landfill has never exceeded that found in other
streams in the area during spring snow melt off. (R. 4-5). The
Lustra Creek now flows beneath the overburden before resurfac-
ing to flow into the Roaring River, which, in turn, flows into the
Columbia River, a navigable water of the United States. Id.
The administrative consent order was issued under the RM-
SWA which details a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the dis-
posal of solid waste. (R. 5). Solid waste only may be disposed of in
permitted landfills. Id. The permits are issued by RMDENR
under the RMSWA. Id. In the absence of a permit, RMDENR may
issue administrative orders to persons in violation of the RMSWA
that require the persons to comply with the statute, be assessed a
civil penalty of up to $2,500 per violation, or face a civil action in
state court, which seeks an injunction requiring compliance, or
both. Id. While interested parties are allowed to intervene in the
state court actions under a practice rule that is virtually identical
2001]
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to FED. R. Civ. P. 24, no public notice or intervention is provided
for in the administrative enforcement actions. Id.
RMDENR, MMC, and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) were each given notice more than sixty days before
the complaint was filed by the Friends of the Lustra, Inc. (FOL)
that FOL intended to sue MMC for alleged violations. Id. FOL
had never complained to the RMDENR before about any alleged
violations by MMC, let alone, about MMC's alleged violations of
the administrative order of placing overburden on the creek bed
until 1998 and not successfully causing the plantings on the over-
burden to resemble the surrounding vegetation within a three
year period. (R. 5).
The State of Rocky Mountain has intervened in this case to
defend its enforcement actions, which are designed to secure com-
pliance with both the federal and state statutes. Id. The State
has noted that MMC did not comply with the RMDENR order in
its entirety and seeks to enforce its order against MMC under
§ 1365(a)(1)(B) of the Clean Water Act [the Act] to prevent the
recurrence of overburden being placed in the creek bed without a
permit. Id. MMC has not challenged the State's attempt to in-
voke federal jurisdiction by using the Act to enforce an order that
was actually issued pursuant to the state's solid waste act. Id.
Procedural History
Summary judgment for MMC on all issues was entered by the
Honorable Judge Remus of the United States District Court for
the District of Rocky Mountain. (R. 3-9). Both FOL and the State
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth
Circuit. Appeal was granted September 1, 2000. (R. 2).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
FOL's citizen suit is barred by the State's diligent prosecution
of MMC. The State diligently prosecuted MMC by issuing a con-
sensual administrative consent order which required MMC to
cease placing overburden in the Lustra Creek and remediate the
area or risk facing an injunction, monetary penalties, or both. In
response to the administrative consent order, MMC ceased the ac-
tivity, made good faith efforts to remediate the overburden, and
has shown no intent to resume the complained of activity. To al-
low this citizen suit to continue is not in keeping with the policy of
the Clean Water Act; for states to be the primary authority re-
[Vol. 19392
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sponsible for deciding which kind of enforcement action to bring
and when to implement it.
Because FOL has failed to make a good faith allegation that
MMC has continued to violate the administrative consent order,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A citizen suit cannot
be brought for wholly past violations. At the time that this suit
was filed, MMC was not in violation of the order nor had MMC
threatened to violate it. In fact, MMC has made overt, good faith
efforts to remediate the affected area and has stated that it does
not intend to violate the order in the future. Both FOL and the
State have failed to show the existence of any active, ongoing vio-
lations, or that MMC threatens to violate the order in the future.
Mere allegations are insufficient to meet the Appellants burden of
showing that subject matter jurisdiction is present.
This case is moot because MMC ceased violation of the admin-
istrative consent order over three years ago. Not only did MMC
cease the activity, MMC complied with the order by making good
faith efforts to remediate the area well before FOL even gave no-
tice of its complaint. Neither Appellant has offered sufficient evi-
dence that MMC has continued its prior activity. Nor can the
Appellants reasonably rely on the capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review, exception to mootness, because it is absolutely clear
from the undisputed facts that there is no reasonable expectation
that MMC threatens to violate the order in the future. Even if
MMC did not voluntarily cease violation, this case is still moot
because at the time of filing there was no active violation of the
order and, therefore, there was no actual case or controversy.
Finally, both FOL and the State of Rocky Mountain are
barred from bringing this action by res judicata. The causes of
action of this case and the administrative consent order are identi-
cal. FOL and the State are in privity, and MMC is the party
named in both this case and the order. Thus, all elements of res
judicata are present. Res judicata is afforded to consent decrees
such as the administrative consent order issued by the Rocky
Mountain Department of Environmental and Natural Resources
because they may be agreed to as a form of settlement. Conse-
quently, these orders are similar to judicial proceedings in sub-
stance and only differ as to their manner of form. Because all
elements of res judicata are present, the administrative consent
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this appeal is from the district court's grant of summary
judgment, the standard of review is de novo. New York Dep't. of
Soc. Servs. v. Shelala, 21 F.3d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1994). On appeal,
the evidence and its reasonable inferences must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. See Brady v. Town of
Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1970). "However, where the nonmov-
ing party will bear the burden of proof at trial, Rule 56 permits the
moving party to point to an absence of evidence to support an es-
sential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Brady, 863 F.2d
at 210, (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
ARGUMENT
I. This court should uphold the judgment of the
district court that FOL's action is barred by the
State's diligent prosecution of MMC because it
is against the statutory goals and policy of
the Clean Water Act to allow citizen suits that are
duplicative of the State's enforcement actions.
A citizen suit for penalties under the Act is barred if the state
is enforcing the state law "to the fullest extent possible." Love v.
New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conserv., 529 F. Supp. 832, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). The state is assumed to be acting diligently
when a suit is brought pursuant to the Act, and the citizens must
prove the contrary. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
890 F. Supp. 470, 486-87 (D.S.C. 1995) (Laidlaw I). It is not
enough for the citizens to claim that the state is not pursuing the
actions desired by the citizens in the timeline the citizens deem
proper. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300,
1324 (S.D. Iowa 1997). The state must fail to pursue enforcement
of the Act. In determining due diligence, the court must consider
the purpose behind the statutes at issue, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365,
1319(g)(6)(A) (1987), and their application in this context.
A. The State's enforcement actions meet the goals and
policy of the Act and thus meet the federal
"diligent prosecution" standard.
Congress statutorily declared that "[i]t is the policy of the
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsi-
bilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pol-
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lution, to plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). The policy that states rights are primary
is supported by the legislative history of the citizen suit provision
of the Act, which indicates that Congress intended to only allow a
citizen suit if the enforcement action is inadequate. Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amends. of 1972, S.REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746.
As long as the state law contains comparable penalty provi-
sions that the state is authorized to enforce, has the same overall
enforcement goals as the Act, provides interested citizens a mean-
ingful opportunity to participate in significant stages of the deci-
sion-making process, and adequately safeguards their legitimate
substantive interests, the state's administrative enforcement ac-
tion is comparable to federal action. See Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n.
v. ICI Americas Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994); North &
South Rivers Watershed Ass'n., v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552,
556 n.7 (1st Cir. 1991). Under those circumstances, the state stat-
ute should be presumed comparable unless the facts of the specific
case demonstrate that the state denied an interested party a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the administrative en-
forcement process. ICI Americas Inc., 29 F.3d at 382. FOL has
not demonstrated that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to
intervene at the time that the administrative action was taken.
The courts have consistently weighed the circumstances of a
case against the Congressional intent and concluded that only if
"the government cannot or will not command compliance" should
a citizen suit be allowed to proceed. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., 484 U.S. 49, 62 (1987) (Gwaltney I); see also Citizens for a
Better Env't v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding that § 1319(g)(6)(A) was written to prevent suits that
were merely duplicative of action already taken by the govern-
ment); cf Laidlaw 1, 890 F. Supp. at 486 ("the critical issue pres-
ently before the court is whether [the state's lawsuit] constitutes
diligent prosecution sufficient under [§ 1365(b)(1)(B)] to bar the
plaintiffs' citizen suit"); North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n,
949 F.2d at 555. Thus, citizen suits only serve an "interstitial"
role to a government action rather than a "potentially intrusive"
one. Gwaltney 1, 484 U.S. at 60-61; North & South Rivers Water-
shed Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 556.
Additionally, the courts have recognized "that the states are
afforded some latitude in selecting the specific mechanisms of
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their enforcement program" and which remedies to pursue. ICI
Americas Inc., 29 F.3d at 380; see also Gwaltney I, 484 U.S. at 60-
61; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(6)(A) (1987) and 1365(b)(1)(B) (1972).
Here, the state imposed an administrative consent order (CAO),
required MMC to correct the violations, imposed a compliance
schedule, and reserved the right to assess additional penalties or
pursue further action if MMC failed to comply with the adminis-
trative consent order. (R. 4). MMC, in turn, ceased placing over-
burden in Lustra Creek, and implemented a comprehensive
remedial action plan in compliance with the order. Id. The action
taken by the state reasonably reflects the history and seriousness
of MMC's past violation.
The First Circuit has suggested that courts must afford ap-
propriate deference to the expertise of the agency enforcing the
state's environmental laws and that "the focus of the statutory bar
to citizen's suits is not on state statutory construction, but on
whether corrective action already taken and diligently pursued by
the government seeks to remedy the same violations as duplica-
tive civilian action." North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, 949
F.2d at 556-57. In short, the court recognized that there was no
point in allowing a suit to go forward if the court could not provide
any meaningful relief because the remedy was already being dili-
gently pursued. It would be unreasonable and inappropriate to
find failure to diligently prosecute simply because MMC's restora-
tion efforts failed to perfectly mimic the surrounding watershed or
because a compromise was reached. Cf Connecticut Fund for the
Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (D. Conn.
1986).
B. FOL's action is duplicative of the State's enforcement
action and is not allowed by the Act.
Congress recognized that a large number of cases would likely
be pursued if citizen suits were allowed despite a state's diligent
prosecution, and the result would needlessly clog court dockets
due to this discrepancy. See Leonard 0. Townsend, Hey You, Get
Off [ofi My Cloud: An Analysis Of Citizen Suit Preclusions Under
The Clean Water Act, 11 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.J. 75 (1999). Thus,
Congress added § 1319(g) to the Act to preclude such suits. Id.
Section 1365(a) includes § 1319(g)(6) as a bar to citizen suits. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a).
Section 1319(g)(6)(A) bars the civil penalty awards in citizen
suits if the state "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
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action under a State law comparable to this subsection" or the de-
fendant has "paid a penalty assessed under this section, or such
comparable state law." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1987).
FOL has argued that § 1365 does not apply here because the
order was not issued through a traditional judicial proceeding pur-
suant to the Act. This argument cannot be correct because it re-
jects Congress's intent to ensure that citizen suits serve a
supplementary role to governmental enforcement of pollution pro-
visions. Permitting a citizen suit when the state chooses not to
enforce pollution controls in court will result in "[e]lected officials
[being] entirely deprived of their discretion to decide that a given
violation should not be the object of suit at all, or that the enforce-
ment decision should be postponed." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., (Laidlaw II), 120 S.Ct. 693, 720
(1972) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The RMDENR issued a consent administrative order to en-
force MMC's compliance with state law regarding waste disposal.
(R. 4). Such orders constituting the commencement of an action
under § 1319 need not be defined as a judicial proceeding and can
bar citizen suits. See Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 852 F.
Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1994); North & South Rivers Watershed
Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 555-56. "The focus of the statutory bar to citi-
zen's suits is not on state statutory construction, but on whether
corrective action already taken and diligently pursued by the gov-
ernment seeks to remedy the same violations as duplicative civil-
ian action." Colorado Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. at 1483, (quoting
North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 556). Further-
more, merely because the order is consensual does not alter the
conclusion that the order constitutes the commencement of an ac-
tion. See ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d at 380.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has focused on the "plain read-
ing" of the statutory provision of § 1319 to provide the appropriate
participation safeguards and prevent states from precluding citi-
zen suits more than the federal government. Citizens for a Better
Env't v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1996).
Though the Ninth Circuit claims to look to the "plain language" of
the statute it ignores the goals and policy explicitly stated in the
Act. Id. contra 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1972). Consistent with the
purpose of § 1319, Congress chose to use the word "identical" in-
stead of "comparable" to describe state enforcement actions and
thereby allows states discretion and limited citizen suits to sup-
plement not replace governmental enforcement actions. See 33
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U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1972). Here, the state statute is the RMSWA.
(R. 4). The purpose of the RMSWA, to protect water quality, is a
purpose consistent with that of § 1319. (R. 7). The RMSWA can-
not be implemented without the RMCWA which has been ap-
proved by the EPA under the Act section 402(c). Id.
FOL argues that the RMSWA does not allow for citizen inter-
vention. The statutory scheme as a whole, however, does provide
for citizen intervention. The RMSWA details two methods of en-
forcement, administrative orders and lawsuits. (R. 5). The State's
statute is similar to FED. RULE CMIL P. 24, which provides for citi-
zens' intervention in state court actions pursuant to the RMSWA.
Id. It is at the state's discretion to choose the initial step in the
process, and the State selected an administrative consent order.
Id. The specific statutory provision need not provide for interven-
tion if the overall enforcement scheme does provide for such inter-
vention. North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 556.
If states were denied such discretionary powers, then citizen suits
would be elevated from a supplemental role to a "potentially intru-
sive" one. Id.
FOL argues that the RMSWA does not allow for penalty as-
sessment as the Act does. On the contrary, the RMSWA does al-
low for similar penalty assessments. The RMDENR may utilize
its power to issue an administrative order to force compliance or
may opt to pursue an injunction or monetary penalties in court.
(R. 5). "Citizen suits are barred where a state agency conducting
enforcement proceedings has the authority to assess financial pen-
alties, regardless of whether the agency actually assesses or seeks
penalties." Williams Pipe Line Co., 964 F. Supp. at 1323 (assess-
ing state law for enforcement authority comparable to the federal
Clean Water Act).
C. Section 1319 bars the issuance of injunctions for
violations subsequent to the administrative consent
order.
FOL argues that, if applicable, § 1319 only bars penalties
prior to the order and does not bar the issuance of injunctions. On
the contrary, § 1319(g)(6)(A) bars "a civil penalty action under
subsection (d) of this section or . . . section 1365 of this title." 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1990). Section 1365 does not distinguish
between civil penalties and injunctions. North & South Rivers
Watershed Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 557. Therefore, § 1319 does bar both
civil penalties and injunctions by incorporation.
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The bar on both types of civil penalties is consistent with the
Congressional intent behind both statutes. ICI Americas Inc., 29
F.3d at 383 ("Allowing suits for declaratory and injunctive relief in
federal court despite a state's diligent efforts at administrative en-
forcement, could result in undue interference with or unnecessary
duplication of the legitimate efforts of the state agency."). An
agency's discretion must not be hindered or proper enforcement
efforts may be thwarted. Williams Pipe Line Co., 964 F. Supp. at
1324. The RMDENR had the power to issue administrative orders
to require compliance and to seek injunctive, or punitive relief, or
both. (R. 5). The RMDENR found that an administrative consent
order would be the most effective means to achieve successful
compliance in this case. Allowing FOL to pursue this suit would
only result in duplicating a legitimate state action. Thus, this
Court should conclude that the State's due diligence bars FOL
from pursuing this case.
II. The lower court correctly granted summary
judgment on the grounds that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the FOL failed to
make a good faith allegation of an
intermittent or continuing violation.
A. Section 505(a) of the Act does not confer jurisdiction
for wholly past violations.
Section 505(a) of the Act states that a citizen suit may be
brought against a party alleged "to be in violation" of the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). The phrase "to be in violation" requires
that there be an intermittent or continuing violation for the suit to
be brought. Gwaltney 1, 484 U.S. at 57 ("[Tlhe most natural read-
ing of 'to be in violation' is a requirement of either continuous or
intermittent violation - that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past
polluter will continue to pollute in the future."). A citizen suit
under section 505(a) of the Act cannot be brought to challenge
wholly past violations. Id. at 64. In short, without a continuing or
intermittent violation, the court does not have subject matter ju-
risdiction. Id.
To establish jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a good faith
allegation of a continuing or intermittent violation and demon-
strate its existence by presenting sufficient allegations of fact. Id.
at 64, 66; Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 843 (S.D.
Ohio 1996). Once a violation ceases to be intermittent, there is no
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real likelihood of repetition. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, 844 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) (Gwaltney II). If
the defendant presents evidence showing there is no genuine fac-
tual dispute that the defendant will continue a violation, then the
plaintiff must demonstrate more than just good faith. Connecticut
Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305,
1312 (2d Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, a plaintiff can establish the court's jurisdiction
by showing one of the following: 1) that violations continued on or
after the date the complaint was filed; or 2) that there is evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likeli-
hood of a recurrence of violation. Gwaltney 11, 844 F.2d at 171;
Natural Res. Def Council v. Texaco Corp., 2 F.3d 493, 501 (3rd
Cir. 1993); L.E.A.D. v. Exide Corp., No CIV.96-3030, 1999 WL
124473, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999). FOL has not shown the
existence of any ongoing violations. The evidence clearly demon-
strates that there were no violations on or after the day FOL filed
suit. Further, the evidence clearly demonstrates that there is no
reasonable likelihood that MMC will continue to engage in inter-
mittent or sporadic violations. Therefore, MMC's alleged viola-
tions are wholly past and the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.
B. MMC did not violate section 301(a) of the Act on or
after the day FOL filed suit.
FOL alleges that MMC violated section 301 of the Act by dis-
charging overburden into Lustra Creek without a permit issued
under section 402 or section 404 of the Act. (R. 3). Section 301
prohibits the discharge of a pollutant unless otherwise authorized
by section 402, section 404, and other sections. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (1995) ("Except in compliance with this section and sec-
tions . . . 402 and 404 of this title, the discharge of a pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful."). Sections 402 and 404 authorize
the EPA or a state to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollu-
tant and the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the
discharge of fill or dredged material into navigable water. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1995) and § 1344(a) (1987). Accordingly, MMC
must "discharge a pollutant" to violate section 301 of the Act. Fur-
thermore, MMC must continuously or at least intermittently dis-
charge overburden, a pollutant under section 502(6) to be in
violation. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1996) (stating the term pollu-
tant includes rock and sand). FOL has failed to demonstrate that
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MMC continuously discharged overburden into the Lustra. The
record is clear that MMC last discharged overburden into the
creek in 1998. (R. 4). Thus, there is no continuing violation be-
cause overburden was not discharged into the Lustra on or after
the day FOL filed suit.
1. Under the Act, to "discharge" is to "add" a
pollutant, and MMC did not "add" a pollutant to
the Lustra on or after the day FOL filed suit.
Section 502(12) states that a discharge is defined as the "addi-
tion" of any pollutant into navigable water from a point source. 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1996). The use of the word "addition" invokes
the continuous violation requirement. Thus, to violate section 301
one must continually or intermittently "add" a pollutant to navi-
gable water. Under the clear and plain language of the Act, to
discharge is to add a pollutant. Gwaltney I, 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987)
("It is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute
is the language of the statute itself."). Yet, neither the Act nor the
Code of Federal Regulations defines "addition" or "add." A com-
mon definition of addition is "the process of adding" and to "add" is
to "increase by attaching more." WEBSTER HANDY COLLEGE Dic-
TIONARY (A. Morehead & L. Morehead, eds. 1980). Since 1998,
MMC has not added any overburden to the creek. (R. 4).
The Seventh Circuit has held that the addition of a pollutant
requires "active conduct." Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 938 (7th
Cir. 2000) ("[A] permit is required only when the party allegedly
needing a permit takes some action, rather than doing nothing
whatsoever."). The addition of dredged material cannot be a pas-
sive activity; thus, any defendant not actively engaged in adding a
pollutant does not need a permit under section 404. Id. at 938.
(stating that plaintiff claimed that silt was being discharged be-
cause a dam was removed causing silt to be picked up off the bot-
tom of the remaining impoundment and deposited downstream).
Rather, the court in Froebel noted that if the defendant had piled
silt on the riverbank and deliberately allowed rainfall to wash it
into the river, then section 404 would have been violated. Id. at
939.
Like the defendant in Froebel, MMC is not actively engaged in
adding overburden to the Lustra. Here, MMC has done "nothing
whatsoever" by allowing the overburden to remain in the Lustra.
MMC only placed overburden on top of the Creek between 1980
and 1998. (R. 4). MMC is not actively engaged in the erosion of
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the overburden, so it is not actively adding a pollutant. See Con-
necticut Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1313 ("The present violation require-
ment of the [Act] would be completely undermined if a violation
included the mere decomposition of pollutants."). Moreover, MMC
did not deliberately pile the overburden in the Lustra to allow the
creek water to wash suspended solids into the Lustra. Therefore,
MMC was not and is not in violation of section 301 on, or after the
date, FOL filed suit.
2. While pollutants discharged without a section 404
permit are generally continuous violations of
the Act, this view is inapplicable because the
overburden does not meet the § 404
definition of fill or dredge material.
In general, fill or dredge material illegally discharged without
a permit under section 404 constitutes a continuing violation until
the material is removed. Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Sasser v. EPA, 990
F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F.
Supp. 684, 700 (D.N.J. 1987); North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v.
Woodbury, No. 87-584-CIV-5, 1989 WL 106517, at *2 (E.D.N.C.
April 25, 1989); see also United States v. Reaves, 923 F. Supp. 1530
(M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Va.
1983), affd 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
481 U.S. 412 (1987). Only one case has held that illegal fill or
dredging activity that occur prior to filing a citizen suit did not
constitute a continuing violation for purposes of citizen suit juris-
diction. Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800 F. Supp. 1113, 1115
(W.D.N.Y. 1992). But, several of the majority view cases do not
deal with citizen suit subject matter jurisdiction, instead, they
consider the assessment of penalties or the tolling of a statute of
limitations. See, e.g., Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. at 700; Reaves, 923
F. Supp. at 1534. Here, the majority view is inapplicable because
the overburden at issue is not fill or dredge material. Further,
this line of cases cannot be applied because the overburden pile
cannot be removed without causing even greater environmental
damage.
a. Under section 404, the overburden is not fill
or dredged material.
Overburden is defined as "all the earth and other materials
which lie about a natural deposit of minerals and such earth and
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other materials after removal from their natural state in the pro-
cess of mining." 43 C.F.R. § 23.3(d) (1983). Dredge material is
"material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United
States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1999). The overburden at issue does
not fall under the definition of fill or dredge material. The over-
burden on top of the Lustra is what lies above the opal ore inside
of Magic Mountain. (R. 4). Because it is not taken from a river or
a stream, the overburden is not dredge material.
Fill material is defined as "any material used for the primary
purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing
the bottom elevation of an [sic] water body." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)
(1999). It does not include "any pollutants discharged into the
water primarily to dispose of waste." Id. At most the overburden
has only incidentally replaced an aquatic area with dry land and
altered the bottom elevation of the Lustra. (R. 4). In reality, how-
ever, it has not replaced the stream or actually changed the eleva-
tion of the bottom of the Lustra because the creek continues to
flow beneath the overburden. Id. The overburden does not meet
the definition of fill material because it was not used for the pri-
mary purpose of replacing the Lustra or changing the bottom ele-
vation of the Lustra.
Furthermore, overburden is waste material, and as such, it is
not fill material. Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 656 (S.D.
W.Va. 1999); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc.,
892 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (D.N.M. 1995) (holding that gold mine
overburden was not fill material subject to section 404); West Vir-
ginia Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-87 (S.D. W.Va.
1989), affd without op., 932 F.2d 964 (4th Cir 1991) (holding that
coal mining overburden in a stream is waste, not dredge or fill
material subject to section 404). Therefore, section 404 does not
apply to the overburden, and MMC does not need a section 404
permit.
b. Public policy prevents the overburden from
being classified as a § 404 violation.
"[0]nly violations having persistent effects that are amenable
to correction, [can] constitute continuing violations." Woodbury,
1989 WL 106517, at *2. 'When a company has violated an efflu-
ent standard or limitation, it remains . . . 'in violation' . . . so long
as it has not put into place remedial measures." Gwaltney I, 484
U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring). In general, fill or dredge mate-
rial deposited in a navigable water is considered a continuing vio-
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lation until removed because the presence of the material is
viewed as a correctable situation. See, e.g., Informed Citizens, 36
F. Supp. 2d at 377.
But, the overburden pile in Lustra Creek is not "amenable to
correction" by removal because the environmental damage and as-
sociated costs far outweigh any benefits of removal. Courts have
frequently considered such ramifications in environmental cases.
See ,e.g., Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207
(1972) ("The decisional process for judges is one of balancing and it
is often a most difficult task."); Reserve Mining Co., v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). The overburden has not significantly de-
graded the water quality of the Lustra. (R 4-5). Yet, it is likely
that removal of the overburden will degrade the water quality.
Such a result must be considered before ordering removal of the
overburden because a "remedy should be fashioned which will
serve the ultimate public weal by insuring clean.. .water." Re-
serve Mining Co., 514 F.2d at 535. Removing the overburden
would not serve the "ultimate public weal" because it would not
ensure clean water. In fact, removing the overburden pile would
cause greater harm to the water quality of the Lustra. Removing
an overburden pile that has been in one location for over twenty
years would involve significant costs, not only to MMC, but to the
environment and people of Rocky Mountain.
Furthermore, contrary to the cases stating the majority view,
the overburden pile has not substantially endangered the Lustra
or the surrounding environment. Currently, the only documented
degradation of water quality allegedly due to the overburden pile
is the increased presence of suspended solids in the Lustra below
the overburden pile. (R. 4). Yet, the concentration of suspended
solids has never been greater than the levels found in other
streams in the area during spring snow melt off. (R. 4-5). Thus,
the use and enjoyment of the Lustra is not significantly affected
downstream by the overburden. Further, individuals who wish to
use the Lustra for recreation are only restricted from doing so for
about half a mile where the Creek runs below the overburden. (R.
4). Other than this half mile, individuals can enjoy the Lustra in
its entirety.
Because the overburden has been present for twenty years,
the equilibrium that has developed between the presence of the
overburden and the flow and use of the Lustra would be com-
pletely disrupted if the overburden were removed. The RMDENR
determined that "removal of the [overburden] from the Creek
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would result in massive disruption of water quality by mud and
silt erosion during the removal process." (R. 4). Thus, it is likely
that an even greater environmental problem and increased costs
to both MMC and the people of Rocky Mountain would likely re-
sult. Therefore, the overburden is not "amenable to correction"
and the overburden cannot be remaining fill or dredge material
that violates section 404 of the Act.
3. The overburden does not constitute a continuing
violation of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act either.
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
materials that remain after the initial act of discharging have
been interpreted to constitute continuing violations. See L.E.A.D.,
1999 WL 124473; Powttstown Indus. Complex v. P.T.L Servs., No.
CIV.91-5660, 1992 WL 50084 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1992); Briggs &
Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356
(M.D. Ga. 1998); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Tri Star Mktg., 990 F.
Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1998). These cases do not apply here because
RCRA has entirely different purposes and goals than the Act.
More importantly, the rationale behind these RCRA decisions is
that the environmental harm is "amenable to correction" by
removal.
The harm resulting from an illegal discharge under the Act is
not the same as the improper disposal of hazardous wastes under
RCRA. Damage done by an illegal discharge under the Act is
often irreversible, and little is gained by allowing a citizen suit
over what cannot be returned to its earlier pristine state. Fal-
lowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. CIV.89-8644, 1990 WL 52745,
at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) ("[T~he discharge of a pollutant into
the water or air normally disperses or dissipates, making cleanup
difficult or impossible."). Although the discharge in this case did
not disperse or dissipate, the overburden is impossible to remove
without causing greater environmental damage. Currently, the
overburden is not "insidiously infecting" the environment. Id.
The environmental impact of the remaining overburden is low;
whereas, its removal may pose greater environmental problems.
Therefore, RCRA does not apply to the present case because the
overburden is not "amenable to correction."
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C. There is no reasonable likelihood that MMC will
engage in intermittent violations.
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, the
defendant had previously violated the Act on a monthly basis, and
the fact that no violations occurred one month before the suit was
filed did not mean that there were no continuing violations. 890
F.2d 690, 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (Gwaltney III). The court held that,
because of the history of monthly violations and no other evidence
indicating that violations had ceased, there was a reasonable like-
lihood that the defendant would again violate the Act. Id.
Whereas, in Allen County Citizens for the Environment v. B.P. Oil
Co., a forty-one month gap between exceedence reported prior to
the complaint and an exceedence reported after the complaint was
filed made the latter exceedence an isolated incident rather than a
continuing violation. 762 F. Supp. 733, 740 (N.D. Ohio 1991),
affid, 966 F.2d 1451 (6th Cir. 1992).
The last time MMC allegedly violated the Act was in January
of 1998. (R. 4). Since 1998, MMC has not placed any overburden
onto or into the Lustra and has made good faith efforts to plant
the overburden with native vegetation as agreed to by the State in
its administrative order. Id. Thus, there has been a three year
gap between the last violation and the filing of the suit. The evi-
dence does not denote a pattern in intermittent violations that
makes it reasonably likely that MMC's will recur in the future.
Under Allen County and the reasoning used in Gwaltney III, this
large gap in time and MMC's good faith efforts show that it is not
reasonably likely that MMC will again intermittently violate the
Act.
FOL can only speculate about what will happen in MMC's
planned Phase Four, which does not have an estimated start date.
(R. 4, 9). By the time Phase Four is implemented and overburden
is discharged, there will be at least a four year gap between this
hypothetical future violation and the last pre-complaint violation
that occurred in January of 1998. (R. 4). Furthermore, because it
takes four months to remove the overburden to the creek, the Ap-
pellants would have ample opportunity to renew their complaint
during Phase Four if it became apparent that MMC threatened to
violate the Act. (R. 9).
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III. Because there is no reasonable expectation that
violations will continue or recur, MMC's
voluntary cessation and compliance with the
administrative consent order moots the
Appellants' case.
The question of mootness is reviewed de novo because it is a
question of law. Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 787 (2d Cir.
1994).
Federal courts may adjudicate only actual, on-going cases or
controversies. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 64 (1997); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. While the heavy burden of persuading
the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to recur lies with the party asserting mootness, City of Mes-
quite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982); Laidlaw
1I, 120 S.Ct. at 708, it is the non-moving parties' burden to demon-
strate that the defendant's allegedly wrongful behavior will likely
continue or recur or that impending injury threatens. Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). Furthermore, to satisfy Arti-
cle III, it must be "likely," as opposed to "merely speculative," that
a favorable decision will redress the plaintiffs' injury. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
It is understood that "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal
conduct" does not of its own force moot a case. United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); City of Mesquite, 455
U.S. at 289. Rather, a case is only moot if the parties do not pos-
sess a "legally cognizable interest in the outcome," Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969), or it is "said with assurance"
that there is no reasonable expectation that the "alleged violation
will recur" and "interim relief or events have completely and irrev-
ocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." County of
Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see Princeton Uni-
versity v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982) (per curiam). The
standard to determine whether voluntary cessation moots a case
is stringent and requires that it is "absolutely clear that the alleg-
edly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968); see Laidlaw II, 120 S.Ct. at 708.
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A. MMC's actions clearly demonstrate that there is no
reasonable basis to expect a violation to recur, and
the Appellants have failed to demonstrate
otherwise.
The Appellants mistakenly argue that MMC's good faith pre-
complaint efforts to achieve compliance were not voluntary and,
thus, do not moot this case. On the contrary, the actions taken by
MMC provide a sound basis for concluding that this case is moot.
MMC's conformity with the standard for mootness is readily
demonstrated by comparing MMC's actions to those of other de-
fendants in "voluntary compliance" cases. For example, in Davis,
the defendant's good faith efforts to comply, permanence of the
changes made to achieve compliance, defendant's history of com-
pliance (or attempted compliance) prior to suit, and the defen-
dant's consistent compliance thereafter, even though remediation
post-dated the filing of the complaint, persuaded the U.S. Su-
preme Court to find the case moot. 440 U.S. at 631-33. In Con-
necticut Coastal, the court was persuaded the case was moot by
the defendant's declaration "that it made a 'final irrevocable deci-
sion' never to reopen the Gun Club to trap and skeet shooting at
any time in the future," which was bolstered by the actual disman-
tling and removal of the trap and skeet houses. 989 F.2d 1305,
1312 (2d Cir. 1993). In Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, the
case was moot because there was no reasonable likelihood that the
university, having reversed its position that gave rise to the con-
troversy, would later change its mind. 464 U.S. 68, 72 (1983) (per
curiam).
In contrast, voluntary cessation does not moot a case when
the facts demonstrate post-suit cessation only, significant pos-
sibilities for backsliding, solely cosmetic changes, partial reform,
or a combination of at least two of these factors. See, e.g., W.T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 634 (showing defendant previously refused
to terminate the illegal actions at issue "despite five years of ad-
ministrative attempts to persuade him of their illegality," and de-
fendant would not agree to avoid similar violations in the future);
City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289, n.11 (city's repeal of objectiona-
ble ordinance did not preclude it from reenacting the provision if
judgment were vacated, and city announced its intention to do so).
Here, MMC's actions to address the overburden in Lustra
Creek were well underway prior to FOL giving its statutorily-re-
quired notice. MMC had ceased placing rock in the creek, had
planted vegetation as required by the administrative consent or-
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der, and was well on its way to full compliance prior to FOL's com-
plaint. (R. 4). Thus, MMC's actions were taken independent of
this suit, and this Court should conclude that MMC met its bur-
den of demonstrating mootness through the cessation of violation
three years ago and its overt, good faith efforts to achieve
compliance.
The Appellants' allegations and the fact that placing overbur-
den in the creek is the cheapest and easiest disposal method are
insufficient bases to meet the Appellants' burden of persuasion.
(R. 4). Neither Appellant has offered sufficient evidence to estab-
lish that the alleged wrongful behavior is continuing or that the
allegedly "threatened injury [is] certainly impending." Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 158 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no reasonable expectation that MMC will violate the ad-
ministrative consent order. It would be an immense and unac-
ceptable stretch to allow a presumption to substitute for such an
expectation. MMC's voluntary efforts in achieving compliance
provide a sound basis for affirming the district court's judgment.
B. Assuming that MMC did voluntarily cease activity,
the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exception to mootness does not apply in this
case.
The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" or "voluntary
cessation" doctrine is nothing more than an evidentiary presump-
tion that the controversy reflected by the violation of alleged
rights continues to exist. Laidlaw 11, 120 S.Ct. at 721 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, 109 (1998)). "The required showing that it is absolutely clear
that the conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur is not
the threshold showing required for mootness, but the heightened
showing required in a particular category of cases where there is
reason to be skeptical that cessation of violation means cessation
of live controversy." Laidlaw 11, 120 S.Ct. at 721-22 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
Satisfying the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" ex-
ception to mootness, requires that (1) there be a reasonable expec-
tation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy,
involving the same complaining party, will recur and (2) the chal-
lenged action is too brief to be fully litigated prior to its cessation
or expiration. Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th
Cir. 1997); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1982); Wein-
2001] 409
29
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
stein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam); National
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 924
F.2d 1001, 1003 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206
(1991). A mere physical or theoretical possibility of recurrence is
insufficient to satisfy these requirements. Murphy, 455 U.S. at
482. Rather, there must be a "reasonable expectation" or a
"demonstrated probability" that the same controversy will recur.
Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149. Here, there is no such demonstrable
probability. The record only shows that Phase Four is planned
and that the prior overload remains in the creek bed per the con-
sensual administrative consent order issued by the State. Based
on these facts, there does not exist a "reasonable expectation" or
"demonstrated probability" that MMC intends to violate the Act.
C. Even if this Court concluded that MMC did not
voluntarily cease violation, the policies underlying
the Act dictate that this Court find this case
moot.
1. If MMC did not voluntarily cease violation, then
MMC meets the less stringent standard for
mootness.
"For claims of mootness based on changes in circumstances
other than voluntary cessation, the showing [required by the de-
fendant] is less taxing, and the inquiry is indeed properly charac-
terized as one of 'standing set in a time frame."' Laidlaw 11, 120
S.Ct. at 722 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 67,
68 n.22 (stating that the case mooted where plaintiffs job change
deprived case of "still vital claim for prospective relief'); Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (stating that case mooted by peti-
tioner's completion of his sentence, since "throughout the litiga-
tion, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 478-80 (1990)
(stating that case mooted by change in federal law that eliminated
parties' "personal stake" in the outcome).
At the time of filing, MMC was already in compliance with the
State's administrative consent order and had taken no action that
threatened Lustra Creek. (R. 4). Thus, there was no controversy
at the time of filing. Citizens lack statutory standing under
§ 1365(a) of the Act to sue for violations that have ceased by the
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time the complaint is filed. Gwaltney 1, 484 U.S. at 56-63 (1987).
Therefore, this Court should uphold the district court's ruling that
this case is moot because MMC was in compliance prior to the suit
being filed.
2. A determination of mootness supports the goals
and policy of the Act.
The statutory goals and policy of the Act must be considered
when weighing whether to allow a citizen suit to proceed. As the
court in Gwaltney I noted,
[ilf citizens could file suit, months or years later, in order to
seek the civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forgo,
then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the [Clean Water]
Act in the public interest would be curtailed considerably. The
same might be said of the discretion of state enforcement
authorities.
484 U.S. at 61. To allow citizen suits to proceed despite ongo-
ing state enforcement efforts provides "citizens and federal judges
the opportunity to re-litigate and second-guess the enforcement
and permitting actions of [the] States." Laidlaw II, 120 S.Ct. at
720 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Elected officials would be entirely
deprived of their discretion to decide which violation should or
should not be the object of suit, or that the enforcement decision
should be postponed. See id. at 719. It is not the intent of Con-
gress or in the public's interest to allow the use of public remedies
for private wrongs.
The State and MMC worked together to resolve the problem
for approximately a year before agreeing on a specific administra-
tive order. (R. 4). MMC has pursued and currently is pursuing a
vigorous effort to successfully achieve full compliance with that
order. See id. Allowing FOL to maintain an entirely duplicative
enforcement action in these circumstances disregards the U.S. Su-
preme Court's admonition that states have primary authority and
discretion to enforce the Act. See Gwaltney 1, 484 U.S. at 60-61.
Defendants in MMC's position will be less likely to agree to ad-
ministrative orders and the associated corrective measures if they
will face the specter of a duplicative citizen suit that rides the
coattails of comprehensive state enforcement. See ICI Americas,
Inc., 29 F.3d at 383 (allowing duplicative citizen suit "despite a
state's diligent efforts at administrative enforcement, could result
in ...unnecessary duplication of, the legitimate efforts of the
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state agency.... [S]uch a result would undermine, rather than
promote, the goals of the [Act], and is not the intent of Congress.");
North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n., 949 F.2d at 556 ("Dupli-
cative actions aimed at exacting financial penalties in the name of
environmental protection at a time when remedial measures are
well underway do not further [that] goal. They are, in fact, imped-
iments to environmental remedy efforts.").
In this case, FOL's citizen suit is not only entirely duplicative
of the State's earlier action, but is an attempt to force MMC to
violate the State's order by removing the overburden and destroy-
ing the remedial measures already taken. The record clearly re-
flects that such removal will damage the environment by "massive
disruption of water quality." (R. 4). No public interest would be
served by allowing a citizen to force MMC to further damage the
environment. This Court should find that the goals and policy of
the Act, to allow the states to decide which type of enforcement
action to take in the public interest, require that this case be
found moot.
IV. Res judicata bars FOL from bringing this suit
because the administrative consent order
effectively adjudicated the same parties or
privies and cause of action.
Under Rocky Mountain law, res judicata applies to orders of
administrative agencies in the same manner as orders of courts.
State v. Williams, 118 R.M. 36, 39 (1999). Consent decrees are
also afforded res judicata effect under state law. State v. Venessa,
94 R.M. 412, 417 (1975). Therefore, the administrative consent
order (CAO) between the State and MMC has res judicata effect.
See, e.g., Citizens Legal Envtl. Action Network, Inc. v. Premium
Standard Farms, Inc., No. 97-6073-CV-SJ-6, 2000 WL 220464, at
*3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2000) (stating that Missouri courts accord
the same res judicata effect to consent judgments as to litigated
ones). The administrative consent order at issue in this case is the
product of what can be characterized as a settlement because it
was consensual. (R. 4). With the consent order in place, the
RMDENR did not have to pursue any other enforcement action.
Therefore, the CAO equates to a judicial order under the doctrine
of res judicata and should be afforded preclusive effect by this
Court because a state court would be obliged to give the order
preclusive effect. Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d
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894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999). Under res judicata, the CAO effectively
bars FOL from bringing this subsequent action.
The test to determine whether res judicata applies involves a
comparison of the actions. If the "(1) [ildentity of the thing sued
for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the person and
parties to the actions; and (4) identity of the quality of person for
or against whom the claim is made" are the same in each case, res
judicata bars the subsequent action. Williams, 118 R.M. at 39
(1999) (adopting the four part test for res judicata set forth in
Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo. 1966) (en banc)).
These four overlapping elements determine whether the parties or
privies and the cause of action are the same between the two suits.
Citizens Legal Envtl. Action Network, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at *3
(referring to how Missouri implements the four part res judicata
test); see also Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
326 n.5 (1979) (stating that a judgment on the merits in a prior
suit bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties or their
privies based on the same cause of action or relief sought). The
identity of the thing sued for and the cause of action are the same
in the CAO and this case, and because FOL and the State are in
privity, they are essentially the same party. Therefore, res judi-
cata bars FOL from bringing this action, and this Court should
affirm the ruling of the court below.
A. FOL and the State of Rocky Mountain are in privity;
therefore, they are the same party in this suit as in
the prior action.
In filing a citizen suit under section 505 of the Act, FOL is
attempting to act in place of Rocky Mountain or the federal gov-
ernment. FOL is, in essence, acting as a "private attorney gen-
eral" in filing the suit to protect the public's interest in Lustra
Creek and the environment in general. EPA v. City of Green For-
est, 927 F.2d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1990); Citizens Legal Envtl. Ac-
tion Network, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at *3, *11. Because the State
diligently prosecuted the public's interest in Lustra Creek, a pub-
lic resource, FOL has the same agenda and interests as the State;
therefore the two are in privity. Id. at *11 ("[C]itizens... are the
same party as the State only as to that which the State has dili-
gently prosecuted."). The State of Rocky Mountain effectively ac-
ted as a parens patriae by issuing the CAO to protect and to
preserve the Lustra for the citizens of Rocky Mountain; therefore,
FOL and the State are the same party. Old Timer, Inc. v.
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Blackhawk Central City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109,
1118 (D. Colo. 1999) (citing Satsky v. Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1993)).
B. The identity of the thing sued for and the causes of
action are the same in this suit as in the prior
action.
The purpose of res judicata is to prevent duplicative adjudica-
tion to save judicial time and resources and to promote reliance on
adjudication. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). This citi-
zen suit is duplicative of the CAO because it attempts to accom-
plish what the CAO has already done. The CAO prohibited MMC
from placing overburden into Lustra Creek to protect water qual-
ity and the environment. (R. 4). These are the same results that
FOL wants from this second action.
The causes of action are the same for several reasons. First,
this subsequent suit threatens rights and interests established by
the CAO. See National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 1230,
1237 (D. Mont. 1987) (stating that res judicata should take into
account whether the rights or interests established in the first ac-
tion would be destroyed or impaired by the second action). FOL
wants the overburden pile removed from the Lustra. This is in
direct conflict with the State's interest in maintaining the over-
burden in the creek. The CAO issued by the State specifically
states that the overburden should not be removed because re-
moval would cause "massive" damage to the Lustra's water qual-
ity. (R. 4). Moreover, the CAO grants MMC the right to maintain
the overburden in the creek without repercussion. Id. Thus, this
citizen suit infringes upon Rocky Mountain's interest as well as
MMC's interest and right to maintain the pile in the Creek.
Second, the two actions arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of material facts. See National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 675 F.
Supp. at 1237 (stating that whether the two suits arise out of the
same transactional nucleus of facts should be considered); Citizens
Legal Envtl. Action Network, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at *4 (stating
that two causes of action are identical for purposes of res judicata
when they arise from the same nucleus of operative fact). Both
actions involve the same "wrong" - MMC placing overburden into
Lustra Creek without a permit. CR.3-4. The facts that demon-
strate that "wrong" have not been altered or added to; therefore,
the "wrong" alleged in this case is the same. Citizens Legal Envtl.
Action Network, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at *4 ("[R]es judicata bars
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separate suits for the same wrong, but not for two or more distinct
wrongs."). The CAO and this suit deal with the same alleged "con-
tinuos violations." The only difference is that the State framed
MMC's actions as a violation of the Rocky Mountain Solid Waste
Act (RMSWA) instead of the Clean Water Act. Overall, both ac-
tions involve MMC's alleged infringement upon the right of Rocky
Mountain citizens to enjoy the Lustra and the environment. See
National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. at 1237 (stating that
res judicata should consider whether the two suits involve in-
fringement of the same right). Finally, the essential substance of
the suits must be measured and not the form of each action. Id.,
citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130 n.12 (1983)).
Despite the fact that the State pursued MMC's actions as a viola-
tion of the RMSWA, the core of the actions is essentially the same.
Each action is designed to 1) prohibit MMC from placing more
overburden into the Creek without a permit, 2) protect water
quality, and 3) protect the overall environment. (R. 3-5). There-
fore, the essential substance of the two suits is practically identi-
cal. Both suits involve identical facts and issues. This citizen suit
does not raise one issue that is different from those raised under
the CAO. The only difference between the two actions is the ap-
proach. To say that the two actions are not the same is to elevate
form over substance.
The State of Rocky Mountain, specifically the Rocky Moun-
tain Department of Natural and Environmental Resources
(RMDENR), corrected the problem - placing overburden in Lustra
Creek - under RMSWA. (R. 4). FOL is taking the same steps as
RMDENR, but in a different form. FOL has brought an action
under the Act and has framed the issue as a water problem rather
than a solid waste problem. This is redundant because the differ-
ence between a water problem and a solid waste problem, in this
case, is superficial. The solid waste problem is a water problem.
In prohibiting the disposal of solid waste (the overburden), the
RMDENR protected Lustra water quality.
As noted by the court below, the Rocky Mountain Solid Waste
Act is only one part of an enforcement regime. (R. 7). The State's
statutes are aimed at improving the environment and preventing
degradation. Id. Just as the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) is a back up to the Clean Air Act and the Act, RMSWA
is also a net for any holes in the Rocky Mountain web of environ-
mental law. H.R. REP. No. 94-149,1 at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241. (stating that RCRA was intended to
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close "the last remaining loophole in environmental law ... [the]
disposal of discarded material and hazardous waste.").
Although the RMDENR did not seek penalties with the CAO,
it could have. The overall statutory framework under which the
CAO was issued provides the state the option of seeking penalties.
(R. 6). The State of Rocky Mountain, in exercising its prosecutorial
discretion decided not to enforce penalties against MMC. FOL is
seeking penalties in this subsequent action. (R. 3). FOL is still
barred because res judicata prevents re-litigation of all claims
that were or could have been raised. Citizens Legal Envtl. Action
Network, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at *6.
Res judicata blocks this action because the parties or privies
and causes of action in this action are the same as those involved
with the CAO. Therefore, FOL's citizen suit is barred.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, that the State's due diligence bars
FOL from bringing this citizen suit; that subject matter jurisdic-
tion is not present; that this case is moot because there was no
controversy at the time this action was filed; and that both FOL
and the State are barred from bringing this action by res judicata,
Magma Mining Co. prays that this Court find that the trial court
properly rendered summary judgment in favor of MMC and affirm
the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
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APPENDICES
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1972)
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollu-
tant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1987)
(1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the
Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a
permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollu-
tants, notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition
that such discharge will meet either
(A) all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or
(B) prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions re-
lating to all such requirements, such conditions as the admin-
istrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this chapter.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such permits
to assure compliance with the requirements of paragraph (1) of
this subsection, including conditions on data and information col-
lection, reporting, and such other requirements as he deems
appropriate.
(3) The permit program of the Administrator under paragraph (1)
of this subsection, and permits issued thereunder, shall be subject
to the same terms, conditions, and requirements as apply to a
State permit program and permits issued thereunder under sub-
section (b) of this section.
(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable waters issued
pursuant to section 407 of this title, shall be deemed to be permits
issued under this subchapter, and permits issued under this sub-
chapter shall be deemed to be permits issued under section 407 of
this title, and shall continue in force and effect for their term un-
less revoked, modified, or suspended in accordance with the provi-
sions of this chapter.
(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable waters shall be
issued under section 407 of this title after October 18, 1972. Each
application for a permit under section 407 of this title, pending on
October 18, 1972, shall be deemed to be an application for a per-
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mit under this section. The Administrator shall authorize a State,
which he determines has the capability of administering a permit
program which will carry out the objective of this chapter, to issue
permits for discharges into the navigable waters within the juris-
diction of such State. The Administrator may exercise the author-
ity granted him by the preceding sentence only during the period
which begins on October 18, 1972, and ends either on the nineti-
eth day after the date of the first promulgation of guidelines re-
quired by section 1314(i)(2) of this title, or the date of approval by
the Administrator of a permit program for such State under sub-
section (b) of this section, whichever date first occurs, and no such
authorization to a State shall extend beyond the last day of such
period. Each such permit shall be subject to such conditions as
the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of this chapter. No such permit shall issue if the Adminis-
trator objects to such issuance.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1977)
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for
public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the
fifteenth day after the date an applicant submits all the informa-
tion required to complete an application for a permit under this
subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required by this
subsection.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1972)
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land
and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the
exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is the policy of Con-
gress that the States manage the construction grant program
under this chapter and implement the permit programs under sec-
tions 1342 and 1344 of this title. It is further the policy of the Con-
gress to support and aid research relating to the prevention,
reduction, and elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal
technical services and financial aid to State and interstate agen-
cies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduc-
tion, and elimination of pollution.
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33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1987)
Action taken by the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case
may be, under this subsection shall not affect or limit the Admin-
istrator's or Secretary's authority to enforce any provision of this
chapter; except that any violation-
(i) with respect to which the Administrator or the Secretary has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under this
subsection,
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this
subsection, or
(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the State has
issued a final order not subject to further judicial review and the
violator has paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such
comparable State law, as the case may be, shall not be the subject
of a civil penalty action under subsection (d) of this section or sec-
tion 1321(b) of this title or section 1365 of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12) (1972)
The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge of pol-
lutants" each means
(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source,
(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous
zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or
other floating craft.
33 U.S.C. § 1362 (6) (1996)
The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked
or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, mu-
nicipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. This term
does not mean
(A) "sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal
operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces" within the meaning of
section 1322 of this title; or
(B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association
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with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well
used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is ap-
proved by authority of the State in which the well is located, and if
such State determines that such injection or disposal will not re-
sult in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1987)
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with re-
spect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce
such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to
order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case
may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section
1319(d) of this title.
33. U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1972)
No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of
the alleged violation
(i) to the Administrator,
(ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and
(iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or
order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States, or a State to require compliance with the stan-
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dard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of
right.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1993)
The term "dredged material" means material that is excavated or
dredged from waters of the United States.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1993)
The term "fill material" means any material used for the primary
purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing
the bottom elevation of an waterbody. The term does not include
any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of
waste, as that activity is regulated under section 402 of the Clean
Water Act. See § 323.3(c) concerning the regulation of the place-
ment of pilings in waters of the United States.
43 C.F.R. § 23.3(d) (1983)
"Overburden" means all the earth and other materials which lie
above a natural deposit of minerals and such earth and other
materials after removal from their natural state in the process of
mining.
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